An emerging consensus holds that achieving successful counter-movement outcomes requires combining overt repression (e.g. raids, arrests, and targeted assassination) with covert repression (e.g. monitoring, agents provocateur, and wiretapping). Research in this article disputes the presumed complementarity between overt and covert repressive tactics. When overt repression signals new information about the state's covert intelligence collection program, challengers respond in ways that frustrate efforts to accumulate new intelligence. These propositions are investigated using original, weekly panel data on a Black Nationalist insurgent organization, the Republic of New Africa (RNA), and US Red Squad counter-movement activities directed against this group (between 1968 and 1971). Using archived materials generated by various policing agencies and their rivals in the RNA, the analyses provide new understanding of dynamics rarely observed or analyzed systematically. Findings reveal that the two methods of political repression can work at cross purposes. Overt repression motivates challenger adaption towards less readily observable tactics and organizational forms; covert repression subsequently fails to identify challengers' actions or identities. These findings hold even while controlling for challenger mobilization and government investment in covert repression. In addition to advancing our understanding of what happens to behavioral challengers when governments repress, the results help to shed light on some of the factors that make defeating domestic challengers so difficult. Each 'step forward' taken by counter-movement forces potentially makes the next one more difficult. But what determines the quantity and quality of government intelligence? Though intelligence is of primary importance to theories of domestic conflict, there have been few direct efforts to examine how governments generate intelligence or how challengers attempt to subvert such efforts. The principal obstacle has been evidence. There has simply been little data describing how authorities accumulate intelligence or how challengers attempt to counter covert repression. Instead, guided by arguments suggesting that information motivates action in political conflict, researchers have typically generated hypotheses derived from information-based mechanisms and tested them on more readily observed behaviors.
Intelligence obtained through covert repressive actions (e.g. monitoring, agents provocateur, wiretapping, etc.) is crucial for political authorities confronting behavioral challenges like protest, terrorism, insurgency, and riots. With intelligence, governments are able to discern who is involved, where these individuals are living, what they are planning to do and/or where the challengers are vulnerable. Without such information, authorities are unable to target specific challengers with overt repressive actions (e.g. raids, arrests, targeted assassination, etc.). Essentially, state forces are left swinging in the dark.
But what determines the quantity and quality of government intelligence? Though intelligence is of primary importance to theories of domestic conflict, there have been few direct efforts to examine how governments generate intelligence or how challengers attempt to subvert such efforts. The principal obstacle has been evidence. There has simply been little data describing how authorities accumulate intelligence or how challengers attempt to counter covert repression. Instead, guided by arguments suggesting that information motivates action in political conflict, researchers have typically generated hypotheses derived from information-based mechanisms and tested them on more readily observed behaviors.
In this study, we directly examine how covert intelligence collection is affected by government and challenger strategies. To investigate these elusive relationships, we take advantage of unique archival sources encompassing the internal records of a blacknationalist organization, the Republic of New Africa (RNA), and US covert repressive agencies directed against the RNA between 1968 and 1971. The research design examines dynamics predicted by our micro-foundational theory as they operated following a case of overt repressive activity. The analyses identify how an intensive raid, arrest, and interrogation of the RNA (known as the 'New Bethel incident') shaped subsequent behavioral challenges as well as how this act of overt repression influenced subsequent intelligence collection. We further show the diminishing success of covert repressive activities, including covert agents' ability to monitor actions and identify members. Through the investigation, we provide more direct evidence on the generation of government intelligence than has previously been presented. We estimate the magnitude of these tactical changes as well as the scope of their effects on intelligence.
The results shed light on some of the factors that make defeating behavioral challenges so difficult. An emerging literature has begun to investigate the reasons for social movement death (e.g. Cronin, 2009; Pearlman, 2011; Davenport, 2015) . In each of these studies, repression is seen as contributing to the demise of the movement.
Government forces taking overt acts to repress challengers may deter members from continuing their participation. But these overt repressive actions can simultaneously inspire tactical adaptation among remaining challengers, limiting subsequent covert repressive capabilities. All of this drains intelligence and makes future acts of covert repression as well as overt targeting more difficult. Effectively each 'step forward' taken by counter-movement forces makes the next one more difficult.
In the remaining sections, we outline the basic model used to understand how repressive action and intelligence interact as well as the methods conventionally used to examine this relationship. In the second section, we present our theory of challenger adaptation and its effects on covert intelligence collection. The third section presents the research design and unique archival data used to examine our conjectures. The fourth section presents the analysis. In the conclusion, we address the implications of our work for academic research and policy development.
Understanding overt and covert repressive tactics
Defeating political challengers requires that government forces generate the intelligence necessary to identify and monitor who is participating challenges as well as take overt actions to constrain, intimidate and/or eliminate those individuals. In other words, governments benefit from engaging in two distinct forms of repressive activity at oncecovert intelligence collection and overt acts of coercion.
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Describing the distinction between the two forms of repression, Davenport (2005: 124) notes that (i)n the case of (overt repressive action), arrest, intimidation, and killing are the strategies of choice. These activities involve public and frequently violent forms of state power… and targets as well as potential targets are intended to know exactly what is being done to them and by whom… In the case of [covert repressive action], however, wiretapping, tails (following targets), and mail openings are the weapons of choice. These activities involve private as well as nonviolent forms of state power and targets are not supposed to know anything about what occurred.
Clearly, this study is not the first to distinguish between overt and covert repression. In addition to Davenport's (2005) operational study of the distinction, other pioneering work looks at bureaucratic processes within the intelligence apparatus (e.g. Marx, 1974; Cunningham, 2004) . But where efforts have been made to identify the relation between overt repression and covert intelligence, such work has focused either on aggregate geographic units (e.g. Davenport, 2005; Gohdes, 2015) or on anonymous 1 While one might divide repressive tactics using alternate metrics, such as repressive targeting (noting the degree to which repression is discriminately or indiscriminately applied) or repressive agents (noting who carries out repressive activity), this study is concerned only with the distinction between the application overt or covert repressive tactics. Future work might identify how the covert/overt distinction interacts with the targeting of political repression or who carries out repressive actions.
tips from civilian informants (e.g. Lyall et al., 2015; Shaver & Shapiro, forthcoming) , 2006: 25) .
Adopting this approach, governments win in their contests with challengers by taking advantage of this positive feedback loop and building the momentum necessary to contain or eliminate movement challengers. These insights can not only be found within the rich literature on counter-insurgency, which has been especially prominent in these discussions, but it can also be found within literatures concerning protest policing (Marx, 1974; 1979) , riot control (Applegate, 1999) , and counter-terrorism (Wilkinson, 2006) .
Across these contexts, it is argued that to defeat challengers, governments must put a premium on surveillance, use that intelligence to carry-out overt repression, and then feed the knowledge gained from those operations back into the application of covert intelligence collection. The expectation is that, ceteris paribus, following overt repression, subsequent covert repression should be more successful.
Reconsidering the relationship between overt and covert repression
While the connection between overt and covert repression appears to make intuitive sense, it is our contention that, rather than operate in a reinforcing manner, the diverse tactics that form the state's repressive repertoire can actually undermine one another. Focusing on a simple set of tradeoffs faced by governments and challengers, we argue that overt repressive action limits subsequent intelligence collection because it inspires challengers to adapt and become more clandestine. The most significant problem is that challengers vary a great deal more than acknowledged in the framework outlined above. For example, if the dissident organization is relatively stable in terms of activities and somewhat open in terms of membership, then it can be penetrated more easily and intelligence can be acquired. If the organization is less consistent in terms of what it does and it is relatively closed to new members, however, then it is harder to be infiltrated and intelligence will be less reliably acquired.
What influences stability or change in challenging organizations? Interestingly, the answer to this directly involves political authorities. Decades of scholarship into dissidents' behavior, presents a dynamic view of responses to repressive action (e.g. Tilly, 1978; McAdam, 1983; Lichbach, 1987; Moore, 1998; Francisco, 2004; Pearlman, 2008; Cunningham & Beaulieu, 2010; Earl & Soule, 2010; Lawrence, 2010; Earl, 2011; Dugan & Chenoweth, 2012; Sullivan et al., 2012; Davenport, 2015; Finkel, 2015; Ritter & Conrad, 2016; Sullivan 2016a; 2016b) . Movements do not maintain consistent strategies in the face of political repression. Rather, they adapt in order to best neutralize the effectiveness of such attacks and most effectively press their claims-making efforts.
According to such studies, movements succeed by continually adapting their organization and tactics to produce new counter-strategies in the face of political repression.
It should be noted that not all research on social movements has supported the idea that tactical adaptation can outpace repressive action. Several studies have highlighted the fact that political repression radicalizes members of the movement, leading them to move away from particular (non-violent) contentious activities and towards other (violent) means of contention (e.g. White, 1993; della Porta, 1995) . Other studies have focused on the development of 'repertoires of contention' among social movements (e.g. Tilly, 2010) . While both theories acknowledge organizational adaptation in the face of political repression, the pace and direction of the predicted adaptation is thought to be limited and foreseeable.
By contrast, we argue that in the face of overt repressive action political challengers are often able to take precisely those actions that cannot be anticipated (cf., Oliver & Myers, 2002; Trebbi et al., 2017 Recognizing that they are being monitored and that such covert repression could increase the likelihood that they would experience some extremely costly sanctions in the near future, movements can be expected to adapt to overt repression in such a way as to frustrate subsequent efforts to monitor their behavior. To the extent that they are able (related to group size, openness of organizational structure, and the availability of alternative strategic policies), challengers adapt to avoid state surveillance in order to minimize their exposure and reduce the potential for further repression. This is done to frustrate intelligence collection efforts in order to limit their exposure to more violent acts of overt repression. For example, traits that made the movement readily monitored will be abandoned, while more clandestine characteristics will be adopted. 
Repression and dissent: The case of the Republic of New Africa
To investigate be allocated five states from the US government: Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina, and 4) be granted reparations for the treatment of blacks.
Toward these ends, the RNA engaged in many legal forms of protest, including rallies, marches, demonstrations, petitions, political education courses, self-defense programs, food drives, lectures, conferences, and the publication of independent newsletters/newspapers, along with illegal and violent activities, including robberies, shootouts with police, plots to bomb state and federal buildings as well as a plane hijacking.
To counter this organization and its claims-making effort, numerous political authorities engaged in electronic and physical surveillance, opening mail, placing informants as well as double agents within the RNA, arresting members for various offenses, raiding their facilities, and even firing upon them. The efforts were organized under a Detroit based anti-radical unit or Red Squad. Historically, Red Squads were charged with monitoring the behavior of organizations deemed radical or violent as well as constraining and/or eliminating targeted organizations (Donner, 1990) . In this case, 
Data and measurement
Information about the Republic of New Africa comes from two archival sources.
The first involves materials generated and archived by the Detroit Red Squad. In pursuing these the RNA, the Red Squad compiled records from the diverse agencies identified First, access was obtained to a compilation of materials directly from the RNA. This contained not only internal records (e.g. diaries, newsletters, press releases, meeting notes, event announcements, coloring books and legal documents), but also numerous government documents as well (e.g. arrest and surveillance reports). Regarding the latter, one of the authors of this article was informed that an officer in Detroit Police Department had said that the documents were likely to disappear and, in this context, they passed these materials to the RNA who subsequently passed them to us. Another source of information was the Walter Reuther Library in Detroit, Michigan. This depository was set up by the city as different political leaders throughout United States cities tried to decide what should be done with the material compiled by the Red Squads. In Detroit, a decision was reached to allow individuals to request and see information pertaining to themselves and at a much later date to allow the larger archive to be seen by anyone interested in them. These records include arrest and surveillance reports. In addition, information is contained about police departmental structure and budgets as well as personnel allocations.
Upon receipt of all this material, everything was divided by side of the conflict (RNA or government), and then subdivided into specific named organizations (i.e. the surveillance or demonstration detail for the police and central government or regional chapter for the RNA). Approximately 50% of the archive are police documents, 20% are other government agencies (i.e. FBI, IRS, and CIA), and 30% are RNA documents (RNA, 2017) . These materials were then placed into chronological order for subsequent event coding.
We are aware that no records come without some difficulties, but we believe that the information employed within this study are superior to other sources and the insights provided by the records provide unprecedented access (Balcells and Sullivan, 2018) .
Additionally, while there is significant overlap between the Red Squad and RNA records, these two sources each identified information that is not contained in the other. Diverse interviews with police from the period, the RNA and legal representatives for the RNA attest to the accuracy as well as importance of the records in detailing what transpired (Davenport, 2015) . While not exhaustive, these efforts are suggestive of their validity and usefulness.
Independent variable
The analyses examine how an act of overt repression historically known as the New The response from government forces was both immediate and pronounced, leading many to speculate that the authorities were already waiting to repress the movement.
Dependent Variables
In line with our interests, the study examines two sets of dependent variables. The first set of variables captures organizational and tactical changes within the Republic of New Africa, while the second set captures the subsequent ability of government agents to successfully engage in covert repression.
Measuring challenger adaptation is done in several ways. As is conventional in the literature on repression and dissent, we begin by examining the effects of overt repression on the total number of RNA events undertaken within a given week (RNA events Combining the RNA documents with the Red Squad files, we identify both the events and participants successfully targeted by covert repressive action (which are taken from the Red Squad files) and those events and participants that covert repression missed (which were taken from the RNA documents). To identify the success of covert behavior, the models variously estimate the number of RNA events and individuals identified in the Red Squad files, controlling for the entire number of events occurring and individuals participating that week. More information on the control variables is discussed within the analyses below.
Qualifications and scope conditions
Using data collected from previously confidential, archived materials generated by the Red Squad along with internal documents produced by the RNA itself, we identify how overt repression influences organizational and tactical adaptation by behavioral challengers and the subsequent ability of the state to gather intelligence through covert repression. Of course, there are tradeoffs in any research design. Ours privileges a direct examination of the causal mechanisms predicted by our theory. In this way, it is a logical continuation of research in the study of large-scale political violence away from macrolevel studies of cross-national variation towards analyzing the micro-dynamics of contention (Tarrow, 2007) . While the mechanisms of our theory are thought to be generally applicable to patterns of state-challenger interactions, future research will be necessary to probe the generalizability of our arguments.
Our analyses estimate how the effects of a large act of overt repression impacted both movement strategy and subsequent covert intelligence collection. This act, which involved a large raid and mass arrest, is significant because it was the first overt action specifically targeted at the RNA, and as a result provides a unique opportunity to observe how challengers responds to new information about repressive action directed against the movement. But it is important to note here that we are not arguing that all repression is likely to affect challengers in the same way. Some forms of overt repression, such as disappearances or indiscriminate attacks, may be less easily interpreted by movement participants. As a result, we do not argue that all overt repression disrupts the cycle between intelligence and overt repression. Instead, we limit the theory to overt actions that provide new information to movement participants. 7 Among such forms of repression, we believe NBI presents a particularly hard test for our theory because the shooting, mass raid, and arrest were followed by the interrogation of more than onehundred RNA members. Clearly, government agents believed this was an opportunity to acquire intelligence.
There are also particularities of the RNA case that are worth considering. This is a case of a Black Nationalist insurgency challenging a strong, democratic state 8 in a principally urban environment (after 1970 part of the group moved to rural Mississippi).
The geography of the conflict is especially pertinent. Drawing primarily on research from rural conflicts, studies of intelligence and counter-insurgency have privileged one particular form of intelligence collection (i.e. civilian defection), while neglecting other means governments employ to collect intelligence (such as wiretapping, surveillance, and double agents). Challengers' need for adaptation is likely greater in urban environments because the government's repertoire of covert and overt repression is generally broader 7 Similarly, it is worth noting that not all intelligence is equivalent from the perspective of the state. Intelligence studies, for instance, often distinguishes between 'strategic' intelligence, which tends to operate over a longer term, and includes information such as leadership identities, movement goals, or recruitment strategies and 'operational' intelligence, which tends to be more short term, and includes information on specific actions, addresses, or identities. 8 To black nationalists, however, the U.S. political system was believed to be more authoritarian as well as more repressive than most would characterize it.
(cf. Staniland, 2010; Christensen, forthcoming) . The relative easy access to resources provided by urban centers also means that urban challengers may be less reliant on local populations, and as a result, are more agile and mobile.
9
Analysis

Identification strategy
Our analyses examine changing patterns of organizational behavior and covert behavior using interrupted time-series (ITS) models. All dependent variables are measured weekly for one year prior to and one year after an act of overt repressive action (i.e. the New Bethel incident). 10 Controlling for time trends present in the data (including both autoregressive and moving average [ARMA] components in each time-series), these models estimate how an act of overt political repression impacts subsequent challenger and government behavior (Enders, 2004) . 11 Results estimate the impacts of NBI by assessing changes in the outcome series independently from their ongoing, stochastic time-series processes.
The logic underlying ITS relates directly to our theoretical argumentation. Left to its on devises, an unrepressed social movement evolves under the momentum of its internal mobilization processes. Mobilization processes are temporally contingent, such that mobilization in any given period t is partially determined by mobilization during the 9 This might vary by the degree to which the relevant locale is racially or ethnically segregated. 10 Examining one year prior to and one year following (to the day) yields a sample of 52 pre-treatment weeks and 51 post-treatment weeks. 11 The Box-Jenkins method was utilized to identify the auto-regressive and moving average components of time trends in each dependent variable. ARMA models were selected over alternative event count-time series models, such as the auto-regressive Poisson model [PAR(p)] or the Poisson exponentially weighted moving average (PEWMA) model for two reasons. The first is ease in the interpretation of the coefficients. The second is that a number of the variables display both auto-regressive and moving-average components, and neither the PAR(p) or the PEWMA models are able to adequately handle both components simultaneously (e.g., Brandt & Williams, 2001; Brandt et al., 2000) .
preceding periods. The same can be said about covert repression, which (theoretically at least) follows a momentum of its own, which is directly tied to movement behavior.
With any ITS design, the modeler must specify the functional form of the proposed trends before, during, and after the treatment (i.e. overt repression). The most common assumption, and the one we employ, is that trends are linear (though including higher polynomials does not meaningfully alter our results). To mitigate the risk of endogeneity, the models estimate the effects of the NBI treatment as an interruption to the time-series beginning immediately after the New Bethel incident. In other words, the New Bethel incident acts a shock occurring on the 53 rd week. Alongside the NBI shock, we include two other parameters accounting for the temporal dynamics in the aftermath of the raid, arrest, and interrogation. First, we include a Post-NBI dummy variable identifying post-NBI weeks. This variable resembles a temporally-variant intercept shift, mirroring standard approaches adopted in ITS models (McDowall 1980) . It models any changes that occurred after NBI and remained consistent through the end of the period.
Second, we include a Decay function, which is scored zero prior to NBI and then counts downward (from 53, declining programmatically by one) each week after NBI. Decay functions are also common in ITS, as they enable the models to estimate temporally dependent effects without assuming that effects either retreat immediately back to their baseline level or persist invariably (ibid.).
Results from ITS models can be interpreted by looking at the average treatment of the NBI shock affecting the rate of the behavior following treatment. Following the shock, government-challenger interactions stabilize to a new equilibrium (cf. Carey, 2006; Trebbi et al., 2017) . The analyses below present this estimate of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). In this case, the ATT resembles the average marginal effect, with the exception that it is restricted to the weeks following NBI, and therefor is conditional on the Post-NBI dummy and Decay function. In other words, the ATT is the estimated shock of NBI as compared to the counter-factual scenario in which the act of overt repression did not occur. The presumption is that NBI shifts the baseline from which subsequent temporal dynamics unfold. Francisco, 2004; Lawrence, 2017) . In the aftermath of NBI, many former members left the movement. But they were replaced by new members, who joined anticipating subsequent repression. 13 The effect not only shifted the membership in ways that made their participants less known to the state, but also made the organizational goals more radical (ibid.). At least in the short term, NBI appears to have made the organization stronger.
13 In other work, we show that the increase in RNA activity was driven by those who were repressed in the New Bethel incident and by new recruits (Sullivan & Davenport, 2017) . Those who were in the movement but not arrested at New Bethel were subsequently less likely to participate in RNA activities. interrogation (Davenport, 2015: 235) . They also reflected on the potential that covert repression had been used prior to NBI. Members took clues both from what took place at NBI and what was notably absent. The group's leader, Imari Obadele (1970: 254) suggested that one reason the state did not engage in more extreme forms of violence at New Bethel was, 'because present at the convention was a number of informers and agents whose identities were not all known to Detroit Police.' In retrospect, of course, the Red Squad documents reveal that suspicions of covert agents and surveillance were justified.
Knowing that they were being surveilled, RNA discussions became were intentionally vague, such as one on April 4, 1969 in which those present discussed how 'top members' had 'gone underground' (Davenport, 2015: 237) . Other surveillance reports document RNA members retaliating against individuals who were presumed to be sharing information about their activities and encouraging others to 'stay cool' (ibid.:
239-240). All of this confirms that the organization saw NBI as confirmation that they were being monitored and that additional steps needed to be taken to limit future surveillance. Movement records indicate that this was a conscious choice -the members believed that their safety had been compromised with NBI, necessitating that something be done to restore it. '[I]ncreasingly reconfigured into a shifting maze of subcommittees,' Davenport (2015: 242) writes, 'the members of the RNA were largely isolated from one another.' Of course, while the organizational compartmentalization was designed to limit surveillance, it also had negative effects on the movement, constraining its mobilization capacities (Obadele, 1970; Davenport. 2015) .
(Figure 2 about here)
Overt repression and the success of covert repression
Displayed in Figure 2 , our analyses estimate the relationship between overt political repression and subsequent covert activity. In the models, the New Bethel incident is significantly and negatively correlated with the number of RNA events identified by the state and the number of participants identified at these events. As above, the analyses control for relevant confounding factors. Models estimating the number of RNA events successfully monitored in a given week (Events surveilled) include a control to deal with the number of events engaged in by RNA members (RNA events). The control is included because increasing the number of RNA actions committed increases the latent probability of observing a greater number of RNA actions through covert repression. The results estimate that following NBI, government agents were able to identify 2-11 fewer RNA events than they would have in the absence of the raid, arrests and interrogations.
Evidence clearly suggests that overt repression hampered the effectiveness of covert repression.
Similar patterns are present when we investigate the number of participants compelling the organization to reduce actions to almost nothing (Davenport, 2015) . Our work also has important implications for research into how repression shapes behavioral challenges because it suggests that the overt forms of repression that are most typically studied should be understood to be highly contingent on the actions of behavioral challengers and on the other forms of repression being applied against them.
Theoretically, the present study introduced additional elements to the strategic calculus most commonly used to understand state-dissident interactions. The study shows how conceiving of social movements as strategically adapting to their changing environment can have a dramatic influence on the expectations of both movement action and repressive success.
Future work should explore the government's decision to escalate to overt repression. This study uses a semi-random shock to examine overt repressive action which is an interesting way to approach the topic, but one that deviates from previous research. Typically, the government and behavioral challengers are believed to be simultaneously choosing strategies (cf. Ritter, 2014; Ritter & Conrad, 2016) . In considering a more dynamic model, future research should also consider when challengers or governments shift toward/away from different forms of contentious politics. Understanding the development of challenges to political order, as well as understanding when such conflicts endure, escalate or resolve themselves, means identifying the oscillation between public and clandestine claims making. While deviating from prior work, however, our research suggests that neither oscillation nor shock approaches should be accepted without additional exploration. Indeed, it may be the case that over the course of a contentious interaction actors move between strategies or stay with one.
Practically, the results provide some insight into the outcomes of repression and dissent. On the challenger's side, our work suggests that challenger organizations seeking to avoid being repressed should respond to coercive behavior with adaptation. In the face of such government activity challengers should change tactics or organizational form.
Combined, the changing membership composition and tactical repertoire work to undermine state intelligence, which in turn will make subsequent acts of overt repression more difficult. This is not to suggest that under these circumstances challengers will succeed. Rather, this is to say that adaptation increases the chances that the group might survive a little longer. On the government's side, our work suggests that political authorities seeking vanquish challengers should anticipate adaptation to the tactics they employ. Staying with one approach after the situation within the challenger has changed is likely to be ineffective. Changing in accordance to the dissident group's adaptation likely improves the government chances. Clearly the studies of the topic must allow for such dynamics in the future. iii 
